Like any other part of the world, Africa is not immune to the intermingling of cultures and civilizations, heritages and horizons, the endogenous and the exogenous, knowledge and imagery. The effects of new communication and information technologies, which still remain the privilege of a minority of political and intellectual elites, cannot conceal the far more profound transformations and reconfigurations that characterize its societies and cultures.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Computational Constructivist Model as an Anticipatory Learning Mechanism for Coupled Agent–Environment Systems” by Filipo Studzinski Perotto. Upshot: Mainstream AI research largely addresses cognitive features as separate and unconnected. Instead of addressing cognitive growth in this same way – modeling it simply as one more such isolated feature and continuing to uphold a wrong-headed divide-and-conquer tradition – a constructivist approach should help unify many key phenomena such as anticipation, self-modeling, life-long learning, and recursive self-improvement. (...) Since this is likely to result in complex systems with unanticipated properties, all cognitive architecture researchers should aim to implement their ideas in full as running systems to be verified by experiment. Perotto’s paper falls short on both these points. (shrink)

Self-understanding is to a great extent defined by narrative: who we are as human beings is determined by the stories we, and others, tell about ourselves. Yet many are unable to compose coherent personal narratives, as their experiences do not fall within the scope of an accepted conceptual framework. Survivors of trauma are particularly apt to fall into this “narrative rift,” where there can be no words to describe, and hence can be no assimilation of, their experiences. Using (...) the example of child sexual abuse, and drawing on the work of Bass, Spence, Schafer, and Guignon, I propose an examination of the nature of narrative fragmentation itself. Philosophical counselling may succeed where psychoanalysis might not: for where the latter has theoretical commitments to specific narratives, the former, through its reluctance to force epistemological or metaphysical assumptions on the narrator, may well facilitate a more comprehensive self-understanding. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)

In EN II.1, Aristotle claims that our nature is inadequate for moral virtue. We are not, he says, in the same relation to virtue as a stone falling to earth; moral excellence is neither by nature nor contrary to our nature but reached by habituation . Other texts such as Pol. I.13 and Pol. VII.12 about natural capacities, as well as those like Phys. II.1 and Meta. V.4 about physis in general, complicate the picture concerning the bases for moral excellence (...) in EN. This essay considers the range of applications of physis, focusing on the practical works, so as to examine the extent to which Aristotle thinks moral and political nature is amenable to external determinants such as cultural education. (shrink)

Men have been talking of death from time immemorial - sometimes sublimely in prose and poetry, in painting and sculpture and in music - till silence seemed to fall in the recent past. Now men are again talking about death - interminably but colloquially. They talk on television, on the radio, in books and in pamphlets. Dr Kenneth Boyd therefore finds it entirely timely to offer this historical sketch of attitudes to death. The earlier part of his paper covers (...) fairly familiar ground but his final and longest section on the work of a social historian, Philippe Ariès, may be new to many. Ariès is reinterpreting the long history of attitudes to death in a form which may well interest those who today are concerned with helping modern man to accept his own death - death which still, for most people, is the death of another, not of oneself. (shrink)

Responsible conduct of research courses are widely taught, but little is known about the purposes or effectiveness of such courses. As one way to assess the purposes of these courses, students were surveyed about their perspectives after recent completion of one of eleven different research ethics courses at ten different institutions. Participants enrolled in RCR courses in spring and fall of 2003 received a voluntary, anonymous survey from their instructors at the completion of the course. Responses were received from (...) 268 participants. Seventy-seven percent of open-ended responses listed specific kinds of information learned; only a few respondents talked about changes in skills or attitudes. The perception that courses did more to provide information than to foster skills or attitudes was verified in quantitative responses. Over 75% of the respondents specifically noted that courses were useful in preparing them to recognize, avoid, and respond to research misconduct. The two principal findings of this multi-institutional study are that respondents reported: a wide variety of positive outcomes for research ethics courses, but that the impact on knowledge was greater than that for changes in skills or attitudes. (shrink)

Kant's system of Transcendental Idealism may be regarded, in the contemporary philosophical perspective, as concerned with the problem whether any linguistic or conceptual system can be regarded as adequately explained in terms of the facts which the system organises. ‘ Transcendental ’ may be understood as what is ‘ non-reducible ’. Kant seems to hold that a linguistic scheme cannot be reduced to the facts which fall within the scheme, and thus it is transcendental to those facts. Formulated in (...) such terms, the Kantian doctrine does not, apparently , propound anything which is new; that facts are tailored to a linguistic scheme is pretty much a well-known doctrine these days. But then, as we shall see, it does say something new; and when we extract that novel element in it, we shall discover also the positive import in the Kantian term, ‘ Transcendental ’. (shrink)

Not so long ago the definition of religion as "a reflection of reality in illusory-fantasy images, ideas, concepts" was perceived as one of the most important arguments of scientific atheism in its anti-religious struggle in the national religious studies. The closeness to the notion of "fantasy" and "fanaticism" made this argument seem irresistible in the fight against religion, as any believer could fall under the murderous characterization of the category of "religious bigotry" it is in some way irreparably backward (...) in comparison to a person with a developed scientific worldview. (shrink)

The meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018) is the problem of explaining the behaviours and verbal reports that we associate with the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. These may include reports of puzzlement, of the attractiveness of dualism, of explanatory gaps, and the like. We present and defend a solution to the meta-problem. Our solution takes as its starting point the emerging picture of the brain as a hierarchical inference engine. We show why such a device, operating under familiar forms of (...) adaptive pressure, may come to represent some of its mid-level inferences as especially certain. These mid-level states confidently re-code raw sensory stimulation in ways that (they are able to realize) fall short of fully determining how properties and states of affairs are arranged in the distal world. This drives a wedge between experience and the world. Advanced agents then represent these mid-level inferences as irreducibly special, becoming increasingly puzzled as a result. (shrink)

This paper introduces a framework for thinking about ontological questions—in particular, the Special Composition Question—and shows how the framework might help support something like an account of restricted composition. The framework takes the form of an account of natural objects, in analogy with David Lewis’s account of natural properties. Objects, like properties, come in various metaphysical grades, from the fundamental, fully objective, perfectly natural objects to the nomologically otiose, maximally gerrymandered, perfectly non-natural objects. The perfectly natural objects, I argue, are (...) the mereological simples, and (roughly) a collection composes an object of degree-n naturalness if and only if its members are arranged F-wise, for some property F that appears in the degree-n natural laws. Arbitrary composites turn out to be perfectly non-natural objects and are metaphysical bystanders. Ordinary composite objects fall in between. Some—e.g., atoms—are very (though not perfectly) natural; others—e.g., tables—are highly non-natural. (shrink)

The increase in life expectancy in developed countries has lead to an increase in the number of elderly people cared for in nursing homes. Given the physical frailty and deterioration of mental capacities in many of these residents, questions arise as to their autonomy and to their protection from harm. In 2005, one of the highest German courts, the Bundesgerichtshof issued a seminal judgement that dealt with the obligations of nursing homes and with the preserving of autonomy and privacy in (...) nursing home residents. An elderly woman had sustained a fracture of the neck of the femur during a fall. The health insurance company held that the nursing home had breached its obligations to protect her from falling and sued the home for the hospital costs of her treatment. However, the BGH maintained that the case of the health insurance was not justified. It held that obligations of nursing homes have to be limited to normal arrangements within reasonable financial and personal effort, and that the autonomy of residents had to be protected from unnecessary interference. Permanent control or even restraining measures to reduce each risk would deprive the patient fully of her autonomy, and must therefore be hindered. Other judgments of other courts have emphasised the “protectionist” approach. The article deals with these different approaches and comments on both rationales. It will be shown that both approaches must be differentiated to establish fully autonomy and protection for nursing home residents. (shrink)

Die Forderung einer Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft, von Husserl zum ersten Mal in dem bekannten Logosaufsatz erhoben, richtet sich nicht, wie meistens gedacht und auch von Dilthey selbst so verstanden ist, gegen den Historizismus von Dilthey, sondern vielmehr gegen dessen Identifizierung von Philosophie mit Weltanschauungsphilosophie und damit mit Weisheitslehre. Husserl hat vom Anfang an bis zum Ende seines Lebens sich der Herausarbeitung dieer Idee gewidmet und die Phänomenologie als Verwirklichung dieser Idee betrachtet. Dementsprechend soll man auch der geläufigen Auffassung zuwider (...) die Phänomenologie vor allem als Wissenschaftslehre auffassen und interpretieren. Die Ablehnung aller Weltanschauungsphilosophie ruft nicht nur das Problem hervor, wie Husserl sich verhält zur Metaphysik, sondern was er unter strenger Wissenschaft versteht. Einerseits ist nach ihm die Trennung und Unterscheidung von Philosophie und Weltanschauung oder Metaphysik in Übereinstimmung mit dem modernen Denken, das gerade erst dadurch zur Herausbildung einer Universitas von strengen positiven Wissenschaften (Mathematik, Naturwissenchaften, aber auch strengen Geisteswissenschaften) gekommen ist, andererseits steht aber seine Auffassung und Ausarbeitung von Philosophie als apodiktischer Wissenschaft im Gegensatz zum modernen Denken. Husserl betrachtet die Phänomenologie als die Realisierung der zuerst von Piaton gestellten Idee von Philosophie als einer endgültigen, einzigen und universalen Wissenschaft, welcher Descartes eine radikale Wendung in die Richtung einer egologischen Apodiktizität gegeben hat. Infolgedessen hat die transzendentale Phänomenologie auch die Aufgabe alle Einzelwissenschaften, sowohl die positiven Tatsachenwissenschaften als die positiven apriorischen, vernunftkritisch zu durchleuchten und dadurch zu Abzweigungen der Philosophie als universaler Wissenchaft zu machen. Wie dieses Verhältnis zwischen positiver Wissenschaft und Phänomenologie als strenger Wissenschaft gedacht werden muss, ist immer ein wichtiges Thema für Husserl gewesen. Die positiven Wissenschaften teilt Husserl ein in Tatsachenwissenschaften und apriorische Wissenschaften (Leibniz' Idee von Wissenschaft der Möglichkeiten kombiniert mit der Idee von invarianten Strukturen). Husserl ist nun der Ansicht, dass eine positive Tatsachenwissenschaft nur eine exakte und strenge Wissenschaft werden kann, wenn sie eine apriorische Wissenschaft neben sich zur Entwicklung bringt oder sich darauf stützen kann, wie es z. B. der Fall gewesen ist mit der empirischfaktischen Naturwissenschaft in Beziehung zu der Mathematik und der reinen Mechanik. Dasselbe Verhältnis soll man sich denken zwischen einer apriorischen (phänomenologischen) Psychologie, einer allgemeinen apriorischen Sprachwissenchaft und Historie und den dazu gehörenden empirischen Tatsachenwissenschaften. Philosophie und Wissenschaft sind für Husserl identisch mit Rationalismus. Dennoch unterscheidet er grundsätzlich zwischen positiver und transzendentaler Rationalität. Durch eine Verbindung von Rationalität und Verständlichmachung (die Methode des Verstehens der Geisteswissenschaften auf das höchste Niveau eines transzendentalen Verständnisses gebracht durch die konstitutive Phänomenologie) hebt die Phänomenologie als absolute Geisteswissenschaft den Gegensatz zwischen Natur-und Geisteswissenschaften auf und entwickelt sich zur sapientia universdis. Im dritten Teil kehrt der Autor zu der Frage zurück, ob Husserl immer die Trennung zwischen wissenschaftlicher Philosophie und Weltanschauung aufrecht erhalten hat auch in den Krisisabhandlungen. Im allgemeinen muss das bejaht werden. Noch in 1924 wird sogar die Frage erhoben, ob Kant, der doch auch Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft entwickeln wollte, wohl eine echte Philosophie gebracht hat und nicht darin verfehlt hat eben durch die Vermischung von wissenschaftlicher Philosophie mit Weltweisheit, die auch von ausserwissenschaftlichen Quellen schöpft, und durch den Mangel an dem Radikalismus der Apodiktizität. Husserl hat die Idee der Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft tatsächlich zur Ausführung gebracht als transzendentale Wissenschaft der Subjektivität d. h. als Deskription oder Hermeneutik des Bewusstseinslebens. Es gibt abo bei ihm eine Verbindung zwischen Wissenschaftslehre und Ratio oder Logos einerseits und Vernunft, Subjektivität und Leben andererseits. Der spätere Husserl hat diese Verbindung immer mehr vertieft in die Richtung einer wissenschaftlichen Lebensphilosophie mit Aufrechterhaltung der Idee der Philosophie als apodiktischer Wissenschaft. Er hat nicht nur den Objektivismus der positiven Wissenchaften zu erhellen und aufzuklären versucht von ihrem Ursprung aus der Lebenswelt, die auch ihr bleibender Boden ist, sondern in dem phänomenologischen Idealismus schliesslich als geistiger Weltanschauung die Lösung aller geschichtsphilosophischen und ethischen Probleme gesehen, die besonders durch die Krise der europäischen Kultur hervorgerufen sind. Die Urstiftung der Griechen und besonders vos Platon findet in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie ihre Endstiftung und in einer geschichtsphilosophischen Deutung des Sinnes der Geschichte, die nach Husserl notwendig universal-teleologisch sein muss, hat die Phänomenologie und die Geschichte der Philosophie die Aufgabe als Selbstverwirklichung der Vernunft zu fungieren (Husserliana VI, § 73). Die Philosophie als strenge Wisenschaft schafft die Möglichkeit dem menschlichen Sein und Werden apodiktische Ziele zu geben und sich berufen zu wissen zu einem Leben und Streben in der Apodiktizität d. h. auf Vernunft hin, was den Menschen allein „selig” machen kann. (shrink)

To eliminate racist prejudices, it is necessary to identify the root cause of racism. American slavery preceded racism, and it was closely associated with genocide. Accordingly, we seek the unique cause of the unique event of genocide + slavery. This was initially justified by religious prejudice, rather than colour prejudice. This religious justification was weakened when many Blacks converted to Christianity, after the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The curse of Kam, using quick visual cues to characterize Blacks as inferior Christians, was (...) inadequate. Hence, the church fell back on an ancient trick of using false history as secular justification for Christian superiority. This trick had resulted in a false history of science during the Crusades when scientific knowledge in translated Arabic texts was indiscriminately attributed to the early Greeks, without evidence. This false history enabled belief in religious superiority to mutate into a secular belief in White superiority. After colonialism, and the Aryan race conjecture, the belief in White superiority further mutated into a belief in Western civilizational superiority, openly propagated today by colonial education. Hence, to eliminate racist prejudice, it is necessary to engage simultaneously with the allied prejudices about Christian/White/Western superiority, based on the same false history of science. (shrink)

This anthology is intended for advanced undergraduates and graduate students in such disciplines as philosophy, psychology, economics, and political science. It includes twenty-one selections falling under three main categories: individual decision theory; game theory and group decision-making; reasons, desires and intentionality. All the pieces have been published before in journals and have proven long term importance to theoretical work in rational action. The volume includes a general introduction on decision theory and a topical bibliography.

Background: Emergency exception to informed consent regulation was introduced to provide a venue to perform research on subjects in emergency situations before obtaining informed consent. For a study to proceed, institutional review boards need to determine if the regulations have been met.Aim: To determine IRB members’ experience reviewing research protocols using emergency exception to informed consent.Methods: This qualitative research used semistructured telephone interviews of 10 selected IRB members from around the US in the fall of 2003. IRB members were (...) chosen as little is known about their views of exception to consent, and part of their mandate is the protection of human subjects in research. Interview questions focused on the length of review process, ethical and legal considerations, training provided to IRB members on the regulations, and experience using community consultation and notification. Content analysis was performed on the transcripts of interviews. To ensure validity, data analysis was performed by individuals with varying backgrounds: three emergency physicians, an IRB member and a layperson.Results: Respondents noted that: emergency exception to informed consent studies require lengthy review; community consultation and notification regulations are vague and hard to implement; current regulations, if applied correctly, protect human subjects; legal counsel is an important aspect of reviewing exception to informed-consent protocols; and IRB members have had little or no formal training in these regulations, but are able to access materials needed to review such protocols.Conclusions: This preliminary study suggests that IRB members find emergency exception to informed consent studies take longer to review than other protocols, and that community consultation and community notification are the most difficult aspect of the regulations with which to comply but that they adequately protect human subjects. (shrink)

Context: The idea for this article sprang from a desire to revive a conversation with the late Ernst von Glasersfeld on the heuristic function - and epistemological status - of forms of ideations that resist linguistic or empirical scrutiny. A close look into the uses of humor seemed a thread worth pursuing, albeit tenuous, to further explore some of the controversies surrounding the evocative power of the imaginal and other oblique forms of knowing characteristic of creative individuals. Problem: People generally (...) respond to humor, i.e., they are inclined to smile at things they find funny. People like to crack jokes, make puns, and, starting at age two, human infants engage in pretense or fantasy play. Research on creativity, on the other hand, has mostly scorned the trickster within. Cognitivists in particular are quick to relegate wit, whimsy, and even playfulness to the ranks of artful or poetic frivolities. Method: We use the emblems of the craftsman, the trickster, and the poet to highlight some of the oblique ways of knowing by which creative thinkers bring forth new insights. Each epitomizes dimensions intrinsic to the art of “possibilizing.” Taken together, they help us better understand what it means to be playful beyond curious, rigorous beyond reasonable, and why this should matter, even to constructivists! Results: The musings characteristic of creative individuals speak to intelligent beings’ ability to use glitches intentionally or serendipitously as a means to open up possibilities; to hold on to a thought before spelling it out; and to resist treating words or images as conventional and arbitrary signs regardless of their evocative power. To fall into nominalism, Bachelard insisted, is a poet’s nightmare! Implications: Psyche is image, said Jung, and when we feel alive we rely on the imaginal to guide our reason. Note that image is not here to be understood as a picture in the head or a photographic snapshot of the world. The imaginal does not represent, it brings forth what we understand beyond words. It does not lock us into a single mode. Instead, it is a call to be mindful, in Ellen Langer’s sense: in the present, mentally alert, and on the outlook for our psyche’s own surprising wisdom (sagacity. Constructivist content: Debates on the heuristic function and epistemological status of oblique ways of knowing have long occupied constructivist scholars. I can only guess whether my uses of Jung’s imaginal or Bachelard’s anti-nominalism would have amused or exasperated Ernst! I do know that, on occasion, Ernst the connoisseur, bricoleur, and translator allowed the rationalist-within to include the poet’s power to evoke as a legitimate form of rationality. He himself has written about oblique knowing as legit! (shrink)

This outline for a paper, which develops a compatibilist analysis of abilities, was completed by David Lewis during his sabbatical in the Fall semester of 2000 and is dated 20 January 2001. Starting from the claim that it’s a “Moorean fact” that we are often able to do otherwise, Lewis provides a “simple proof of compatibilism.” He then presents his own account of abilities: S is able to A if and only if there are no obstacles to their A-ing, (...) where an obstacle is a “robust preventer”: something that would cause S not to A, and which “wouldn’t go away if things were just a little different.”. (shrink)

This paper argues that the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence should not offer guidance in situations where there is insufficient evidence equipoise about the potential benefit of the treatment in question. This is broadly for two reasons. First, without knowing if the treatment is effective no cost-effectiveness judgement can be logically made. Second, the implementation of a population wide change in treatment where there is equipoise amounts to a de facto clinical trial that falls outside the Clinical Trials (...) Regulations. As such there are strong ethical and possibly legal grounds for preventing such an outcome. Guidance based upon insufficient evidence equipoise also impacts upon the clinical discretion possessed by individual medical professionals. (shrink)

Let us accept the quantum mechanical description of a free particle and one fact from special relativity: rest mass contributes to energy. If we add to this bare framework one additional fact—that time runs slower near the earth—we can account for our everyday experience of gravity.

This anthology is intended for advanced undergraduates and graduate students in such disciplines as philosophy, psychology, economics, and political science. It includes twenty-one selections falling under three main categories: individual decision theory; game theory and group decision-making; reasons, desires and intentionality. All the pieces have been published before in journals and have proven long term importance to theoretical work in rational action. The volume includes a general introduction on decision theory and a topical bibliography.

The paper highlights the alienation and separation produced by science—technology between man and nature, and between man and man. The principal thesis in this paper is that such separative mentality is the root cause of the deterioration in ethics even in unexpected quarters. Warnings about this were foreseen by a number of Indian livers and thinkers during the early twentieth century. Their prophecies seem to be unfortunately coming true. After sharing this sample of opinions, several recent cases of vicious unethicalities (...) all over the world have been presented. This is followed by a brief survey of Western thought over the past six decades which too was mature enough to caution us about the blind onslaught of technology. The paper concludes by arguing for a complete overhaul of the vocabulary of modern discourse from the objective to the subjective. (shrink)

In this dissertation I consider the merits of certain nominalist accounts of phenomena related to the character of ordinary objects. What these accounts have in common is the fact that none of them is an error theory about standard cases of predication and none of them deploys God or uniquely theistic resources in its explanatory framework. -/- The aim of the dissertation is to answer the following questions: -/- • What is the best nominalist account on offer? • How might (...) it be improved? • Does it ultimately succeed? -/- I will argue that while so-called trope theory is the best account on offer, it can be significantly improved—or replaced—by a novel version of nominalism that is modeled after trope theory. Ultimately, however, I will argue that even the novel version fails. -/- The dissertation unfolds as follows. In Chapter 1, I introduce Austere Nominalism (AN), which is perhaps the most extreme version of nominalism that falls within the scope of the dissertation. AN is often described as the view that there exist only concrete particulars. According to AN, it is unnecessary to posit any entities other than ordinary objects—turkeys, tables, and the like—in order to account for explananda related to the character of those objects. (Such explananda include the phenomenon of attribute agreement, of attribute possession, of true subject-predicate sentences, etc.) In this chapter I argue that AN fails to provide an adequate account of these explananda. In addition, introducing and criticizing AN serves an important heuristic role for the rest of the dissertation. To understand this role, we must distinguish between the basic explanatory strategy deployed by the austere nominalist and the type of explananda for which she deploys that strategy. The austere nominalist deploys the strategy to account for the character of ordinary objects. As I argue in Chapter 1, this deployment is a failure. As I go on to show in Chapter 2, the widespread rejection AN has led to a variety of rival accounts of the character of ordinary objects. In rejecting AN, however, these accounts also tacitly reject its basic explanatory strategy. Thus goes the baby with the bathwater, since, arguably, there are some attractive features of AN’s basic explanatory strategy. Indeed, those who defend the most prominent version of nominalism—trope theory—seem to overlook the advantages of AN’s basic strategy, and by so doing, make an unnecessary concession to the realist. Or so I argue in Chapter 3. And, as I will argue in Chapter 4, the strongest version of nominalism is a novel account, modeled after trope theory, that deploys AN’s basic strategy at a more fundamental level than that of ordinary objects. This novel account—troper theory—is closer in spirit to AN than is traditional trope theory. (Thus, AN serves as a foil for the discussion of other nominalist views.) Finally, in the Afterword I indicate how troper theory is equally vulnerable to some of the traditional objections that plague trope theory. Thus, if you are not convinced that traditional objections to trope theory are conclusive and you want to be a nominalist, then you should abandon trope theory and adopt troper theory. If you take traditional objections against trope theory to have significant force, then you should reject both theories. (shrink)

Students from a small, private, religious college and a large, public university completed questionnaires asking their perceptions of academic dishonesty at their institution. The questionnaires used a 5-point Likert scale to determine whether the students felt it was acceptable to cheat for a specific reason such as plagiarizing or copying homework both using and not using technology. Between fall 2005 and fall 2013, 1792 usable questionnaires were collected using similar methodology, questionnaires and respondents to control for possible extraneous (...) variables. An analysis of the data provides indications that student acceptance of many types of academic dishonesty has decreased over the past 9 years. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Christian List has argued for the compatibilism of free will and determinism. Drawing on a distinction between physical possibility and agential possibility, List constructs a formal two-level model in which the two concepts are consistent. This paper's first contribution is to show that though List's model is formally consistent, philosophically it falls short of establishing a satisfactory compatibilist position. Ensuingly, an analysis of the shortcomings of the model leads to the identification of a controversial epistemological assumption (...) implicit in the statements of both compatibilist and incompatibilist positions. Arguing that this assumption is not currently satisfied, the paper's second contribution is to show that neither the compatibilist nor the incompatibilist position is presently well-founded. (shrink)

The work of Professor Jaeger on the Aristotelian metaphysics, and its modification by the late Hans von Arnim, have raised many new points of the greatest interest, and may, I hope, be considered as having opened up a large and fascinating new field for discussion rather than as having closed the matter. It is a subject which must be considered as a whole. There would be little profit in writing short notes on isolated points in the arguments of the two (...) scholars. Anyone who, possessed of some previous acquaintance with the Aristotelian corpus, reads their work is inevitably stimulated to return to Aristotle with his mind full of fresh ideas. If after a re-examination of the texts he feels he has a different story to tell, he must tell it for himself. That is my excuse for an account which must include much which was always known and much which has arisen out of the work of Jaeger and von Arnim. My conclusions are not the same as theirs, and the argument must stand or fall as a consistent whole. (shrink)

The increasing use of cluster randomised trials in low-resource settings raises unique ethical issues. The Ottawa Statement on the Ethical Design and Conduct of Cluster Randomised Trials is the first international ethical guidance document specific to cluster trials, but it is unknown if it adequately addresses issues in low-resource settings. In this paper, we seek to identify any gaps in the Ottawa Statement relevant to cluster trials conducted in low-resource settings. Our method is to analyse a prototypical cluster trial conducted (...) in a low-resource setting with the Ottawa Statement; to identify ethical issues in the design or conduct of the trial not captured adequately and to make recommendations for issues needing attention in forthcoming revisions to the Ottawa Statement. Our analysis identified six ethical aspects of cluster randomised trials in low-resource settings that require further guidance. The forthcoming revision of the Ottawa Statement should provide additional guidance on these issues: streamlining research ethics committee review for collaborating investigators who are affiliated with other institutions; the classification of lay health workers who deliver study interventions as health providers or research participants; the dilemma experienced by investigators when national standards seem to prohibit waivers of consent; the timing of gatekeeper engagement, particularly when researchers face funding constraints; providing ancillary care in health services or implementation trials when a routine care control arm is known to fall below national standards and defining vulnerable participants needing protection in low-resource settings. (shrink)

Toward Unity among Environmentalists is Bryan Norton’s most developed effort to surmount the frequently intractable debate between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists. Norton argues that the basic axiological differences between the two positions have become irrelevant at the level of policy formation. His thesis is that the two camps converge when dealing with practical goals and aims for environmental management. I argue that Norton’s approach falls significantly short of establishing such a convergence because of the overall methodological framework for policy formation that (...) he defends. The key problem with that framework is that it fails to provide for the degree of species protection most suitable to the nonanthropocentrist position. (shrink)

On behalf of the society for the Advancement of American Philosophy and with pride and pleasure, I offer to the readers of the journal a selection of papers presented at the 37th meeting of the society, sponsored by the University of North Carolina, Charlotte, and Queens University of Charlotte and held in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 11-13, 2010. This Proceedings Issue represents the first of such issues to be published in The Pluralist, which is now the official journal of (...) our society.The Pluralist and the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy share a similar mission, namely to focus on pluralism and inclusion in philosophical conversation of many different points of view. In carrying out. (shrink)

Following the seemingly endless debate over managed care liability, I cannot suppress thoughts of Yeats’s poem, “The Second Coming.” It is not the wellknown phrase, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,” that comes to mind; although that could describe the feeling of a health-care system unraveling. The poem’s depiction of lost innocence — “The best lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity” — does not allude to the legislature, the industry, the public, or the medical (...) or legal profession. What resonates is the poem’s evocation of humanity’s cyclical history of expectation and disappointment, with ideas as grand as justice and occupations as pedestrian as managed care. Writing in 1919, Yeats described the end of an era with images of war’s destructive forces. The poem expresses a universal desire for some miraculous rebirth or resolution of all problems: “Surely some revelation is at hand.” But instead, the brutish Sphinx-like creature emerges, possibly the Antichrist. New gods displace old gods in the cycle of civilization, and man must muddle on. (shrink)

Following the seemingly endless debate over managed care liability, I cannot suppress thoughts of Yeats’s poem, “The Second Coming.” It is not the wellknown phrase, “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,” that comes to mind; although that could describe the feeling of a health-care system unraveling. The poem’s depiction of lost innocence — “The best lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity” — does not allude to the legislature, the industry, the public, or the medical (...) or legal profession. What resonates is the poem’s evocation of humanity’s cyclical history of expectation and disappointment, with ideas as grand as justice and occupations as pedestrian as managed care. Writing in 1919, Yeats described the end of an era with images of war’s destructive forces. The poem expresses a universal desire for some miraculous rebirth or resolution of all problems: “Surely some revelation is at hand.” But instead, the brutish Sphinx-like creature emerges, possibly the Antichrist. New gods displace old gods in the cycle of civilization, and man must muddle on. (shrink)

Narrow Band-pass filtering techniques have been a challenging task since the inception of audio and telecommunication applications. The challenge involves keeping quality factor, gain and mid-frequency of the filter independent of each other. The critical applications require a design that ensures mid-frequency immune to the circuit component tolerances. It becomes increasingly difficult for low-frequency applications where the shift in few Hz in mid-frequency would cause desired frequencies to fall outside the filter’s bandwidth and go undetected. The selection of right (...) topology of the filter for the best performance is the key to successful design. This book objectively compares the relative performance of none popular narrow band-pass filter topologies. The filter topologies are evaluated using a real-world practical example of designing an extremely narrow band-pass filter. The book provides guidelines for selecting the right topology for the low-frequency narrow band-pass filter. (shrink)

This paper inquires into the nature of intertheoretic relations between psychology and neuroscience. This relationship has been characterized by some as one in which psychological explanations eventually will fall away as otiose, overthrown completely by neurobiological ones. Against this view it will be argued that it squares poorly with scientific practices and empirical developments in the cognitive neurosciences. We analyse a case from research on visual perception, which suggests a much more subtle and complex interplay between psychology and neuroscience (...) than a complete take-over of the former by the latter. In the case of vision, cross-theory influences between psychology and neuroscience go back and forth, resulting in refinement in both disciplines. We interpret this case study as showing that: (1) Mutual co-evolution of psychological and neurobiological theories, exemplifying persisting top-down influences from psychology, is a more empirically adequate way to describe psychoneural theory relations than a view on co-evolution, favoured by reductionists, which regards the cross-theory contributions from psychology as merely heuristically useful with no enduring influence on neurobiological theorizing; (2) In research on vision, discovering (or hypothesizing) the neural basis of functions vindicates psychological approaches, it does not eliminate them; (3) Current work on vision shows that many perceptual phenomena must be understood in terms of dynamical interactions between an observer and his/her environment. Therefore, we argue that internalist characterizations of the visual system must be supplemented with externalist accounts that address these reciprocal observer-environment interactions involved in vision. Such processes seem quite different from (internal) cellular and molecular ones, and as such seem to lie outside the scope of neuroscientific inquiry. We conclude that psychoneural reduction or elimination is implausible as a meta-theoretical prediction of theory choice in empirical work. Instead, this case study of vision shows that both psychology and neuroscience contribute to, and complement one another in the study of visual perception. (shrink)

Do undergraduate students perceive that it is more acceptable to ‹cheat’ using information technology (IT) than it is to cheat without the use of IT? Do business discipline-related majors cheat more than non-business discipline-related majors? Do undergraduate students perceive it to be more acceptable for them personally to cheat than for others to cheat? Questionnaires were administered to undergraduate students at five geographical academic locations in the spring, 2006 and fall 2006 and spring, 2007. A total of 708 usable (...) questionnaires were returned including 532 from students majoring in business-related disciplines and 139 from students majoring in non-business related disciplines (37 were undecided). It appears that in terms of intellectual property violations, undergraduate students in general find cheating using IT more acceptable than cheating without the use of IT. It also appears that undergraduate students perceive that it is relatively more acceptable for them to personally cheat when using IT than for others to cheat when using IT, although this is reversed when IT is not involved. No significant differences on these issues were found between undergraduate students having business discipline-related majors and those having non-business discipline-related majors. (shrink)

The work of Professor Jaeger on the Aristotelian metaphysics, and its modification by the late Hans von Arnim, have raised many new points of the greatest interest, and may, I hope, be considered as having opened up a large and fascinating new field for discussion rather than as having closed the matter. It is a subject which must be considered as a whole. There would be little profit in writing short notes on isolated points in the arguments of the two (...) scholars. Anyone who, possessed of some previous acquaintance with the Aristotelian corpus, reads their work is inevitably stimulated to return to Aristotle with his mind full of fresh ideas. If after a re-examination of the texts he feels he has a different story to tell, he must tell it for himself. That is my excuse for an account which must include much which was always known and much which has arisen out of the work of Jaeger and von Arnim. My conclusions are not the same as theirs, and the argument must stand or fall as a consistent whole. (shrink)

It has been asserted that there is no one universal proposition with which all philosophers would agree, including this one. The pre dicament has rarely been recognized and almost never accepted, although neither has it been successfully challenged. If the claim holds true for philosophy taken by itself, how much more must it of religion, the hold for crossfield interests, such as the philosophy philosophy of science and many others. The philosophy of educa tion is a particular case in point. (...) The topic of education itself is generally regarded as a dull af fair, a charge not entirely without substance. The blame for this usually falls on the fact that it has no inherent subject matter. The teachers of history teach history, the teachers of biology teach biology; but what do the teachers of education teach? Presumably how to teach; but this simply will not do because every topic requires its own sort of instruction. (shrink)

Contemporary discourse is littered with nasty and derailed disagreements. In this paper we hope to help clean things up. We diagnose two patterns of thought that often plague and exacerbate controversy. We illustrate these patterns and show that each involves both a logical mistake and a failure of intellectual charity. We also draw upon recent work in social psychology to shed light on why we tend to fall into these patterns of thought. We conclude by suggesting how the intellectual (...) virtues can militate against these fallacies, focusing on the virtues of charity and humility. (shrink)

If scientists rely on assumptions rather than logic, empirical confirmation, and falsification, they are no longer doing science but ideology – which is, by definition, unethical. As a recent US National Academy of Sciences report put it, “bad science is always unethical.”1 This article discusses several ways in which toxicologists can fall into ideology – bad, therefore unethical, science. In part because of the increasing expense of pollution control, some toxicologists have been reexamining pollution dose-response curves that are non-monotonic, (...) that is, curves in which the direction of some response changes with increasing or decreasing dose.2 Ethanol is a classic example of a non-monotonic dose-response curve because moderate drinking is associated with lower risks of heart disease, whereas heavy drinking is associated with higher risks.3,4 If some low-dose pollutants exhibit adaptive or “beneficial effects,”5 this might suggest re-thinking pollution regulations which presuppose linear no-threshold (LNT) dose-response curves. (shrink)

For medical interventions there is a gap between what clinical scientific research has established as likely to carry clinical benefit and what the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) has judged as cost-effective. This gap is the affordability gap. It is created by a value judgement made by NICE and affirmed by the Secretary of State for Health. This value judgement operates to affect other value judgements made in actual clinical situations where at least one choice of treatment falls into (...) the affordability gap. This paper considers how the creation of this affordability gap impacts upon actual clinical decisions. It explores these issues in the context of the choice between a drug-eluting stent and a bare metal stent for elective coronary angioplasty. It also argues that the option of an NHS procedure with a top-up fee to cover the cost of the affordability gap is a genuine one; that this option could improve clinical outcomes; that it is morally acceptable; and that the rules that prevent the utilization of this option should be relaxed. (shrink)

Thought experiments are one among the oldest and effectively employed tools of scientific reasoning. Hacking (Philos Sci 2:302–308, 1992) argues that thought experiments in contrast to real experiments do not have a life of their own. In this paper, I attempt to show that contrary to Hacking’s contentions, thought experiments do have a life of their own. The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I review the reasons that Hacking sets out for believing in the (...) life of experiments. Second section discusses Hacking’s characterization of thought experiments. The section also reviews his arguments for denying a life to thought experiments. In the third section, I argue for a life of thought experiments. In this section, I discuss the historical evolution of the EPR thought experiment and Galileo’s Free Falling Bodies in detail to show the untenability of Hacking’s arguments. The third section is followed by a conclusion that thought experiments do have a life of their own. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Method in Ancient PhilosophyDavid K. GliddenJyl Gentzler, editor. Method in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. viii + 398. Cloth, $72.00.The fifteen papers in this collection constitute revisions of conference proceedings and reflect the varied interests of participants. The ensemble exhibits a thoroughly modern methodology. Whatever and however various ancient methods of philosophy may have been, in Anglo-American scholarship it is standard practice to first address established (...) scholarly interpretations as the primary entry point to critical discussionóoften displacing antiquity with a critical vocabulary of philosophical modernity. Scholars may come to understand each other better, but at the risk of asking the wrong questions or sacrificing ancient texts themselves as mere means of producing papers.Most scholars are progressives. They believe philosophy has advanced past the comparatively primitive wisdom of antiquity, and so such scholars feel perfectly entitled to make better sense of ancient texts, by patiently explaining what the ancients would have meant had they only been able to get it right. There are, of course, exceptions. And some papers in this collection suggest deeper faith in our philosophic fathers. So, the battle between the ancients and the moderns is joined once more, between those who would adorn their papers with footnotes for their peers and those who would attempt more anthropological an inquiry into ancient philosophic practices.Ian Mueller and Robert Bolton each address the same passage in Plato's Phaedo, both beginning with an article from Vlastos, first published in 1969. Mueller thoughtfully explores three different yet related accounts of what we might call scientific method in explaining Plato's views on natural change. Bolton wonders whether scholars are asking the wrong questions. Patricia Curd attempts a progressivist account of Eleatic thought, notwithstanding her recognition of the paucity of ancient sources. Complete with elaborately numbered sentences, Gail Fine focuses primarily on Burnyeat (1976) on Plato on Protagoras. Constance Meinwald presents a rather near-sighted account of two passages in the Philebus that employ the peras-apeiron distinction, with a view toward Plato's allegedly modernist mathematization of understanding. Lesley Brown revisits five pages of the Sophist that were hotly debated in the 1960s. With charity and elegance, she offers several plausible solutions to puzzles posed by previous scholars. Sometimes time smoothes over differences.A. A. Long's essay on Plato's presentation of Socrates in the Theaetetus might appear more philosophically anthropological. Yet Long reveals progressive sympathies, suggesting that Plato dispatches Socrates in the Theaetetus, so as to prepare the way for a more rigorously academic form of philosophizing, such as that exhibited in the Sophist. [End Page 111] In this way, Long speculates, Plato abandoned practical ethics for the academic life of research, so familiar to university professors and conference participants. It might be hard to square such speculation with Plato's Laws and the reception of Plato's writings among his own contemporaries. Still, Socrates' shifting role in Plato's dialogues is well worth pondering.By comparison, T. H. Irwin's contribution is wonderfully old-fashioned. His paper addresses the background knowledge to be presumed by ancient readers of Plato's dialogues and how that knowledge is artfully put to use in Plato's depiction of Socrates' reflections on the unity of virtue. By speculating on Plato's relation to his ancient readers, Irwin displaces many modernist preoccupations, though not without himself falling victim to that peculiar scholarly obsession of dating Plato's dialogues by their doctrines.With characteristic conservatism, Gisela Striker cautions scholars not to over-read Aristotle's Prior Analytics. While that extraordinary work may have deep implications for the history of formal logic, it probably was instead intended to be part of a general account of argument. In a similar vein, Charlotte Witt attempts to rescue Aristotle from scholars who would delimit Aristotle's multifarious uses of the "for the sake of" explanation, which altogether pervade his metaphysics, physics, biology and ethics. Yet, Witt soon finds herself competing in a contest over interpretive distinctions, a sport that will certainly never capture Aristotle's own authorial intentions.Facing another mass of scholarship, in this case on Aristotle's dialectic, C. D. C. Reeve sensibly attempts to... (shrink)

The work under consideration attempts to discover a definition of game such as may serve as a foundation for a philosophical theory of games. It incorporates material from papers earlier published in Philosophy of Science, Ethics and in Osterhoudt's Philosophy of Sport. The exposition consists in the defense of a proposed definition against an array of criticisms until, after considerable exploration, a revised definition is arrived at to which no further objection is made. The author assures unity of form and (...) content by presenting the material in the manner of a philosophical dialogue and then by embellishing the dialogue with genial language and charming examples. As a result, it is clear that the search for a definition of game is meant to be a case that falls under the eventual definiendum. Although this work not only counters the Wittgensteinian proscription against definitions but does so relative to just that example by which Wittgenstein intended to show that the search for definitions is futile, the author cautions in the Preface that it was not his objective to write an "anti-anti-definitional manifesto." Yet engaging as this study is, the definition in which it culminates will neither dissuade the Wittgensteinians nor fully convince those more sympathetic with its aims, for the treatment of such topics as make-believe games and "Bernean" games seems less than conclusive, and the definition's implications may be problematical for questions such as, e.g., whether love-making is to be construed as a game and whether activities governed by Robert's rules of order qualify as games. The last chapter's metaphysical excursus on games, work, and life departs from the earlier playfulness, and the author's contention that ultimately it is games that make life worthwhile gives this study a serious character that goes beyond that customarily associated with a search for a definition. This study has value both for the specialist working in the philosophical theory of games and for the teacher seeking a text that will expose students to careful philosophical reasoning, analytical and critical skills, and the methodologies of counter-example and mental experiment, and do so in an imaginative and appealing way.--J.K. (shrink)